IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

RACHEL FLEMING,)	
A/K/A RACHEL MCCUIN FLEMING,)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	No. 3:13-CV-2665-P
)	
AXA EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE,)	
Defendant)	

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b) and an order of this court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:

Factual Background:

Plaintiff has filed this action for life insurance benefits. She is proceeding *pro se*, and the Court has granted her leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Defendant is AXA Equitable Life Insurance.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant wrongfully denied her claim for life insurance benefits and instead awarded the benefits to her daughter. She seeks \$32,000 in damages.

Discussion:

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. "They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). They "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." *Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 993 (2001).

In this case, Plaintiff claims that diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. She states she is a resident of Texas, and Defendant is a resident of North Carolina. For diversity jurisdiction to exist, however, the amount in controversy must exceed \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff states the amount of the life insurance policy is \$25,000 and the total amount in controversy is \$32,000. (Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire Answer No. 4 and attached Exhibit). Plaintiff therefore does not allege the diversity of citizenship necessary to proceed under § 1332. *See Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 945 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[t]he burden of proving that complete diversity exists rests upon the party who seeks to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction.").

Courts have a continuing obligation to examine the basis for jurisdiction. *See MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp.*, 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court may sua sponte raise the jurisdictional issue at any time. *Id.* Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) requires that federal courts dismiss an action "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter." Because it appears that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, this action should be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Court recommends that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed this 27th day of August, 2013

PAUL D. STICKNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).